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NOTE
MAY A PLENARY PARDON SET ASIDE A DIVORCE GRANTED
ON THE GROUND OF THE CONVICTION OF A FELONY?
The States of Arizona' and Texas2 both provide that a divorce
libel cannot be filed on the ground of the conviction of a felony until
one year after final judgment of conviction. However, the Arizona
statute then proceeds to answer the perplexing question constituting
the title of this article in the negative while the Texas statute answers
it affirmatively Nine other States by statute answer the question as
does Arizona. Massachusetts 3 requires that the felon be sentenced
to at least five years imprisonment. Michigan,4 Nebraska,i and
Wisconsin' provide that the felon be sentenced to at least three years
impnsonment. Michigan further provides that if the felon is sen-
tenced to life imprisonment the bonds of matrimony are severed
without the necessity of a divorce. Mississippi7 limits her answer to
a pardon granted after the felon is sent to the penitentiary West
Virginia" goes furthest of all by stipulating that even if a divorce libel
is filed before the pardon but not yet issued nevertheless the pardon
may not be set up in defense. Minnesota, " , Virginia,'0 and Wyomingi
are the remaining States.
There has been a judicial answer to the question only twice, by
Georgia directly and by Louisiana in the form of obiter dicta, both
courts reaching the same conclusion existing in the ten States by
statute in opposition to the Texas statute. In 1906 Mr. Presiding Jus-
tice Cobb of the Supreme Court of Georgia in Holloway v Holloway"-'
stated that: "The pardon restores the convict, so far as the public is
concerned, to the position he occupied before the conviction. He is
no longer infamous. He may vote, hold office, and perform other
public functions. Rights which have accrued to individuals as a re-
sult of the conviction are not affected by the pardon." However, il
'Arizona Code Ann. 1939, vol. 2, chap. 27, sec. 802.
"Vernon s Tex. Civ. Stat. Ann., vol. 13, tit. 75, chap. 4, art. 4629.
Mass. Ann. Laws, vol. 6, chap. 208, sec. 2.
Mich. Stat. Ann., vol. 18, tit. 25, chap. 245, sec. 25.85.
Neb. Rev. Stat. 1943, vol. 3, chap. 42, sec. 301.
"Wis. Stat. 1947 vol. 2, chap. 247, sec. 7.
7Miss. Code Ann. 1942, vol. 2, chap. 2, sec. 2735.
'-West Va. Code 1943 Ann., sec. 4704.
Minn. Stat. Ann., vol. 31, part 2, chap. 518, sec. 6.
"0 Va. Code Ann. 1942 Ann., tit. 45, chaj. 205, sec. 5103.
Wyoming Comp. Stat. Ann. 1945 Ann., vol. 1, art. 59, sec. 3-5905.
1 126 Ga. 459, 461, 55 S.E. 191 (1906).
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criticism of this opinion the obvious might well be pointed out in that
part of the position the convict occupied before the conviction so far
as the public is concerned was the status of a married man. Mr.
Presiding Justice Cobb instead of grounding his decision in the vested
rights theory might have reasoned that the right of the wife to a di-
vorce upon her husband's being sentenced for the commission of an
offense involving moral turpitude was inchoate, initiate, or condi-
tional upon her husband's not being pardoned either before or after
a divorce. The whole purpose of a plenary pardon is to work a com-
plete restoration of all personal, civil, and political rights.
The following year, in 1907, Mr. Justice Monroe of the Supreme
Court of Louisiana in Abshire v Hanksi 3 made the following signifi-
cant remark, " we will not undertake to say that condemnation
to an infamous punishment may not continue to be a cause for divorce,
even after a plenary pardon has been granted."
The Itolloway decision and the Abshre dicta constitute implied
law in those twenty-seven States ii which the conviction 'of a felony
is made by statute a ground for divorce without mention of the effect
of a plenary pardon and in which the matter has not received judicial
cognizance, namely, Alabama, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Con-
necticut, Delaware, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky,
Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North
Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Ten-
nessee, Utah, Vermont, and Washington.
HowAnD NEwcoxrn X\IonsE, Member of
of Bar of the State of Georgia.
11 119 La. 425, 44 So. 186, 187 (1907).

